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The nature of the City of London as an offshore financial centre has long made London dependent on the 
British state providing protection from external political regulation, even as London’s foreign currency 
business separated its interests from British governments’ economic policy pre-occupations. Since the 
2008 crash and the onset of the euro zone crisis, London has faced threats to both its autonomy from 
external regulatory demands and to its offshore business interests at the same time as the long-standing 
external statecraft of British governments around EU membership has broken down. The Cameron 
governments’ efforts to protect the City within the EU under political conditions that were transformed by 
the euro zone crisis exposed the limits of Britain’s position as a member of the European Union. When 
David Cameron then tried to resolve the problem of EU membership through a referendum he made it 
extremely difficult to defend the City’s broader commercial interests in the Single European Market 
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As an international financial centre with significant offshore interests, the City of London has long 
occupied a complex political position. Since the 1950s the City has been dependent on the protection of 
British governments against external political interference from states in whose currencies the City is 
doing business whilst simultaneously posing a potential political problem for British governments whose 
own political interests are inherently tied to national democratic politics. This tension has often proved 
perfectly manageable from the City’s perspective because of the external policies pursued by British 
governments.  As Jim Bulpitt (2008) argued, British governments have long deployed a statecraft by which 
they have relied on an external economic support structure to try to realise their own political goals whilst 
attempting to minimize external penetration from that structure into domestic affairs. Moreover, since the 
late 1970s British governments have actively deployed this statecraft in ways that have advanced the 
City’s position as an international financial centre.  However, the 2008 crash and, in particular, the euro 
zone crisis have proved very awkward in their consequences for the City’s political position both because 
they have politicised the City’s offshore business abroad and damaged the ability of British governments 
to maintain their existing external statecraft. In the fallout the City has suffered its most significant political 
defeat since the 1930s over Britain’s membership of the European Union.  
This paper seeks to analyse the City’s political problems in relation to Britain’s membership of the 
EU from a historical perspective in relation to the City’s offshore currency interests. Analytically, it situates 
these problems in the context of the perennial external and domestic political dilemmas faced by British 
politicians governing Britain as a democratic polity, using the conceptual language of statecraft deployed 
by Bulpitt (1986; 2008). The paper is divided into three sections. The first offers a schematic history of 
developments in the relationship between the City’s currency interests and the statecraft deployed by 
British governments in relation to the changing international economic and political environment from the 
end of the First World War to 2007. The second section analyses the fall-out of the 2008 financial crash 
and the euro zone crisis for the City’s position as an offshore dollar and euro centre, culminating in the 
fallout for the City of the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union. The final 
section draws some conclusions.  





British statecraft and the City 1919-2007 
 
From the middle of the nineteenth century until 1914 Britain possessed in sterling the world’s premier 
currency and the City of London was the world’s undisputed financial centre. During this era the City 
prospered in its internationally-focused commercial operations through sterling business (Ingham, 1984). 
When, however, British monetary dominance was ended by the First World War and the dollar became 
the dominant international currency, the City began to lose its status as the world’s premier international 
financial centre. Thereafter, London’s capacity as a financial centre depended on integrating itself into 
increasingly dollar-based international financial markets, which were shaped by financial corporations in 
New York. To this end, the City was aided by the policies of British governments during the 1920s.  As the 
City turned towards American markets, British governments looked to construct a statecraft in which they 
could deal with the domestic political problems generated by relative British economic decline through an 
external support structure centred in significant part on a monetary, financial and political relationship with 
the United States (US) (Bulpitt, 2008, p. 122). 
The post-First World War strategies of both the City and British governments were dealt a sharp 
blow in the 1930s by demise of the Gold Standard and the subsequent shift across the world towards 
economic nationalism. For the City, there was simply less international financial business to compete for 
in a world in which capital flowed much less freely and where under President Franklin Roosevelt the 
American government deemed an internationally-oriented financial sector a hindrance to American 
economic recovery. For British governments, Britain’s exit from the Gold Standard in 1931 and the 
American shift from 1933 towards more confrontational economic relationships with other states 
precipitated a turn towards the construction of an imperial economic bloc, which effectively discriminated 
against American goods and capital. Under this more imperial statecraft, the City’s interests were 
secondary. Indeed, the National governments that governed Britain for much of the 1930s deployed 
exchange controls that directly discouraged the City from the international financial activity on which it had 
premised its post-war operations (Michie, 2005, p. 25).  
This imperial statecraft did not survive the Second World War.  Britain’s financial dependency on 
the US to fight the war ensured that the Roosevelt administration could demand that Britain participate in 
an American-led multilateral post-war economic order. Meanwhile, the City began the post-war world in a 
clearly subordinate position as an international financial centre to New York and tied to a weak domestic 
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economy subject to capital flight. The response of the war-time and Attlee governments to the post-war 
international economic order and the City’s predicament within it was Janus-facing. On the one hand 
British governments in the 1940s sought to construct a new external support structure around the re-
established relationship with the US and in doing so welcomed the monetary autonomy provided by the 
restrictive international financial order that the Roosevelt administration established at the Bretton Woods 
conference. On the other, British governments tried to salvage some kind of international role for sterling 
as a reserve currency within what had been the old imperial economic bloc, even after it proved 
impossible to maintain sterling convertibility for more than six weeks in the summer of 1947 and sterling 
was devalued in 1949 (Thompson 2008, pp 78-98). 
This complex approach towards exchange rate matters in post-war statecraft has created some 
historiographical difficulty in conceptualising the relationship between the City and the British state. Some 
scholars have seen the commitment of British governments to maintain the value and status of sterling 
through the 1950s and most of the 1960s as clear evidence of the City’s entrenched political position 
within the state through a nexus that connected the City to the Treasury and Bank of England (Cain and 
Hopkins, 2001; Ingham, 1984; Burn, 1999). However, this interpretation of the economic commitments of 
post-war British governments runs into two difficulties. First, British governments had a quite different and 
significantly stronger incentive to maintain sterling’s position in the 1950s and 1960s, namely to lessen the 
financial burden of oil imports. Quite simply, so long as there were oil companies operating in Britain’s 
remaining imperial protectorates in the Gulf willing to sell oil in sterling, the British economy required fewer 
dollar earnings to support oil imports (Galpern, 2009). Second, sterling was simply far too weak a currency 
for City to re-launch around international commercial operations in sterling.  
In reality for the first part of the post-war period the City’s interests developed independently from 
sterling. The City’s recreation of itself as an international financial centre depended on the City detaching 
from sterling business and shifting to dollar business (Jones, 1993, pp. 248-87). Most significantly, London 
created an offshore euro-dollar market by which foreign currency deposits that were exempt from the 
Britain’s capital and exchange controls could be lent through banks’ offices in London (Baker & Collins, 
2005).  With this market in place, the City was able to showcase the contrast between the informal 
supervision of the Bank of England and the post Glass-Steagall regulatory environment in the United 
States to attract a significant number foreign banks to locate in London through the 1960s (Cottrell, 2005, 
p. 177; Moran, 1990, pp. 56, 85).  
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Certainly, London’s move towards recreating itself as an offshore dollar centre came with political 
support from the Conservative governments of the 1950s (Schenk, 1998; Green, 2016).  In this sense the 
City did reassert a strong political claim on British governments after its essential defeat in the 1930s.  
Nonetheless, British governments in the 1950s and, especially, the 1960s could not entirely embrace the 
City’s offshore orientation as part of their own statecraft. Their primary economic interest was the defence 
of sterling both to reduce dollar expenditure on oil and, through the 1960s, to maintain American support 
as financial pressure mounted on the post-war Bretton Woods order. Indeed, in this context, the presence 
of the euro-dollar market in London as an outlet for international capital flows made their macro-economic 
management in relation to sterling’s weakness more difficult.  
By the end of the 1960s, the external support structure that post-war British governments had 
constructed around the remnants of the imperial economic bloc and the Atlantic relationship was 
collapsing even as increasing numbers of American banks arrived in London (Bulpitt, 2008, p.144). In 
November 1967, the Wilson government finally gave into the devaluation of sterling, and, shortly after, 
announced a withdrawal of Britain’s military involvement east of Suez including the Gulf protectorates, 
leaving the Johnson administration in both instances infuriated. Consequently, when the Bretton Woods 
order began to disintegrate in the 1970s British governments had virtually no influence in Washington, 
symbolised by the Nixon administration’s entirely unilateral decision to end dollar-gold convertibility and 
effectively rip up the whole basis of the Bretton Woods order. After the subsequent collapse of the 
multilateral fixed exchange rate regime in March 1973 and the first American moves towards financial 
liberalisation a year later, British governments were left to manage sterling without any external financial 
and political support. When this proved impossible in 1976 the Callaghan government had to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund for loans that came with significant fiscal conditionality, nullifying one of the 
two primary purposes of the previous external support structure, namely to minimize external penetration 
into domestic British affairs (Bulpitt 2008, p. 144). 
 
EU membership and financial liberalization 
 
 The exhaustion of this post-World-War-Two external support structure eventually opened up the 
possibility of a new statecraft that proved more directly complementary to the interests of the City. First, in 
1973 the Heath government procured Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) 
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with open access to EEC markets offering the eventual prospect of an integrated financial services market 
that London was in a strong position to dominate. Second, in October 1979, the first Thatcher government 
abolished capital and exchange controls. This move made the Britain the first state after the US to 
embrace financial liberalisation and gave London significant commercial advantages over European 
competitors. Finally, the second Thatcher government pushed the Big Bang reforms to the London Stock 
Exchange with the aim of re-launching London as a distinctive international financial centre without 
restrictive practices privileging domestic firms in securities and merchant and retail banking (Moran, 
1990). In outcome, Big Bang transformed the structure of various financial markets, produced foreign 
takeovers of old City firms, led foreign financial corporations to increase their presence in London just as 
the European Community was moving towards completion of the Single European Market (SEM). 
Consequently, by the second half of the 1980s, London was in a position to dominate the increasingly 
integrated EC financial markets and, facing both westwards and eastwards, challenge New York once 
again as the world’s premier international financial centre. For British governments the City’s re-launch 
was also a domestic boon since as manufacturing decline continued it left the British economy with a 
financial sector with rising comparative advantages.   
Yet this new EC-shaped external economic support structure that advanced the City’s European 
turn also produced a number of statecraft difficulties. Most significantly, the European Community came 
with much greater risk of domestic penetration than Bretton Woods, particularly on monetary matters. In 
1978, the Callaghan government decided to stay out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for fear of 
the macro-economic restriction imposed by membership of a fixed exchange rate regime. Unable to 
resolve the conflict between the clear constraints that would be imposed by ERM membership and the 
ongoing sterling problems of the 1980s, the Thatcher government became increasingly bitterly divided 
over the direction of economic policy, gradually shredding the Conservative party’s reputation for 
governing competence (Thompson, 1996).  
These statecraft problems were deepened by the arrival in 1988 of the euro on the European 
Community’s agenda. Joining the proposed monetary union would have entailed sacrificing the national 
currency and accepting deep penetration of British economic policy by external institutional agents. Yet 
from the perspective of the City’s position in the new statecraft any political choice that simply eschewed 
monetary union contained obvious risks. In a scenario in which monetary union occurred and Britain 
remained outside the currency zone, London appeared to risk losing out to Frankfurt as the primary centre 
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of cross-border European financial activity and Britain’s political influence within the European Community 
would diminish. Whilst opinion in the City was far from unanimous that London needed euro membership, 
some in the Conservative Cabinet, supported by the Bank of England, made the argument that the option 
of entry had to be preserved for the sake of the City (Thompson, 1996, pp. 136-138). Indeed, when, in 
November 1990, Mrs Thatcher dismissed the whole notion of Britain participating in any form of monetary 
union her Cabinet colleagues removed her from office.  
In this sense the arrival of monetary union from the onset exposed the limits of a European-shaped 
external support structure. The European Community, or the European Union as it became after the 
Maastricht Treaty, was useful for British governments so long as it extended market opportunities, not 
least for the City. But as a site of political decision-making it was extremely difficult to influence in ways 
that suited British governments’ ongoing desire for a large degree of autonomy in domestic politics 
(Bulpitt, 1996). Consequently, EU membership by the early 1990s appeared to force a choice for British 
politicians between acquiescing to the end of national monetary sovereignty or accepting the development 
of a potentially hostile political bloc within the SEM with quite possibly deleterious consequences for the 
City. The difficulty of that strategic choice was then compounded by the fragility of sterling, which 
simultaneously made the undertaking of joining a rules-based monetary union an even greater risk and 
the prospect of staying out of it a likely renewed source of currency weakness (Thompson 1996, pp 181-
214).  Having dispensed with Mrs Thatcher, the Conservative government under John Major’s leadership 
eventually responded to this dilemma by buying Britain’s politicians more time to decide through an 
arrangement in the Maastricht treaty whereby Britain secured an opt-out of the third stage of monetary 
union that could be turned into an opt-in at a later date.  However, Major’s Maastricht compromise quickly 
disintegrated under the weight of sterling’s exit from the ERM in September 1992. With Major’s 
government never managing to recover from the political fallout of the ignominy of the ERM failure and its 
destruction of the last shreds of the Conservative party’s reputation for governing competence, no 
Conservative Prime Minister could contemplate trying to turn the opt-out of monetary union into an opt-in 
(Thompson, 1996, pp 198-214).   
Yet for all the manner in which EU monetary matters wrecked the Thatcher and Major government’s 
statecraft, by the second half of the 1990s the whole economic and political context in which British 
politicians could contemplate the external economic and political landscape was transformed.  First, in the 
middle of 1995, sterling de-coupled from the movements of the European currencies around the 
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Deutschmark and started to float upwards with the dollar. Extraordinarily, after a succession of sterling 
crises had bedevilled British economic policy for seven decades, sterling weakness effectively 
disappeared from 1995 as an external constraint on British governments and would not reappear until the 
very different circumstances of 2008. Second, after 1992 and sterling’s exit from the ERM Britain’s relative 
economic performance improved, meaning that for much of the next fifteen years the British economy 
grew more rapidly than the other large European economies. Third, after the introduction of monetary 
union in 1999, London quickly emerged as the most important centre for euro-denominated trading with 
large financial corporations concentrating their euro foreign exchange dealing and non-sovereign euro 
denominated business in London (Roberts, 2005, p. 309).  
As monetary union turned from a potential threat to the City’s European business to another 
offshore opportunity so these developments from the mid-1990s created the chance for British politicians 
to restructure a statecraft around the SEM part of EU membership and the relative national macro-
economic autonomy created by retaining a national currency. The New Labour government was able to 
double down on the advantages of the SEM, particularly as they pertained to London’s position as an 
international financial centre, and to pursue a macro-economic policy unconstrained either by monetary 
union or sterling weakness. More than any of its predecessors, the New Labour government emphatically 
embraced a financially open international economy in which the City could prosper. As Brown put it to the 
Institute of Directors in 2005: ‘globalisation was made for Britain’ (Quoted in Shaw, 2012, p. 238). 
Unsurprising the City’s offshore business strongly benefitted from the New Labour government regularly 
touting the ‘light-touch’ regulation practiced by the Financial Services Authority to encourage international 
business to leave New York for London, especially after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act tightened US company 
accounting regulation. Having already seen off the euro threat from Frankfurt, the City was able to cement 
a position as the world’s leading financial centre, enjoying by 2007 the biggest share of international bond 
markets, over-the-counter derivatives, foreign exchange turnover, and cross-border bank lending (Talani, 
2013, pp. 22-3) and do so precisely under conditions premised on minimal interference from the British 
state.  
In sum, by the early 2000s British politicians, in part by strategic decision-making and in part by 
good fortune, had established a statecraft in regard to EU membership that took advantage of the macro-
economic autonomy that non-membership of the euro offered and via the SEM allowed the City to flourish 
as the offshore financial centre of the euro in addition to its longer-standing commercial activities around 
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dollar business.  In this domestic and external environment, the City enjoyed considerable autonomy from 
both British regulatory authorities and the external regulatory bodies governing the two principal foreign 
currencies in which it traded, as well as political protection from a settled external statecraft.  
  
The statecraft cannot hold: the road to Brexit  
 
The 2008 financial crash and the euro zone crisis began a serious disruption to this state of affairs.  
From the onset of the crises London’s reputation as the beneficiary of ‘light-touch regulation’ left the City 
open to external political attack. On the US side, politicians and regulators, with an interest in explaining 
away the problems of American financial corporations, repeatedly criticized London as the epicentre of 
reckless risk taking. For example, in Congressional hearings in 2012, the Chairman of the US Commodity 
Future Trading Commission, Gary Gensler, declared that the large US investment banks had used their 
London branches as an offshore centre because of lax British regulation only for the problem to ‘come 
right back here, crashing to our shores’ (quoted in Jones, 2012). Moreover, the US regulatory authorities 
become significantly more interventionist after 2008 in relation to foreign banks. Much of their attention 
focused on British banks. In 2009, Lloyds TSB agreed to pay fines totalling more than $500 million for 
breaches of US banking rules about Iran and Sudan.  Subsequently, US regulators financed Barclays, the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC and Standard Chartered for breaking anti-money-laundering rules and 
Barclays and Lloyds for LIBOR offences. The fines for Standard Chartered and HSBC totalled $2.6 billion. 
Meanwhile, the US Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations made HSBC an exemplary case 
study of the US’ vulnerability to money laundering and drug and terrorist financing. In outcome, these 
moves have damaged the City’s reputation and advanced New York’s. In 2014, the Global Financial 
Centres Index rated London behind New York as the world’s top financial centre for the first time since the 
index began in 2007 (Pickford, 2014). 
Certainly, British banks were not alone in facing the ire of US regulators. In June 2014, BNP Paribas 
agreed to pay a $9 billion fine to the US Justice Department for violating US sanctions and accepted a 
year long ban on it engaging in certain dollar transactions (Barrett, Matthews, & Johnson, 2014). This fine 
prompted French President, François Hollande, to try to construct a common EU front towards the United 
States over its treatment of European banks (Carnegy, Arnold, & Scannell, 2014). Yet even in doing so 
Hollande did not depart from the French government’s insistence from 2008 that Britain was more a 
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problem in regard to finance rather than part of any solution. After the financial crash the French 
government regularly deployed confrontational rhetoric towards London, accusing Britain of being part of 
the very Anglo-American approach to finance that it saw as responsible for the crisis. For example, when 
Michel Barnier, a French politician, was appointed EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services in 
2009, President Sarkozy declared it ‘a defeat for Anglo-Saxon capitalism’ (quoted in Waterfield, 2009) and 
said ‘the English are the big losers in this business’ (quoted in Munchau, 2009). Indeed, once the euro 
crisis began, a situation in which in the words of Springford and Whyte (2014, p. 6) ‘the City of London is 
at the core of Europe’s financial system, but sits outside the euro zone’ became unacceptable to many in 
the French governing class. 
In this new political context, the euro zone authorities and a coalition of other European Union 
states after 2009 proposed or enacted a series of measures with a direct or disproportionate effect on 
London as a financial centre.  By early 2009, the Bank of France was pushing for the euro zone states to 
create a clearing house inside the euro zone for credit default swaps to challenge London’s clearing 
house, LCH.Clearnet, engaging in this business (Grant, 2009).  In July 2011, the ECB issued an initial 
policy paper stating that clearing houses handling more than five per cent of euro-denominated product 
should be located within the euro zone that was then followed by a number of practical proposals. Since 
London’s clearing houses do more euro business than any other financial centre in the European Union, 
this ‘locational policy’, as it became known, could only result in London losing business to Frankfurt and 
Paris (Fleming, 2014). Meanwhile, the EU member states passed new legislation on a number of financial 
services issues. In October 2011, the EU member-states and the European Parliament reached a final 
agreement, against the opposition of the British government, authorising the European Securities and 
Market Authority to ban short selling in emergencies. Most significantly, in 2011 the European 
Commission proposed a financial transactions’ tax with revenues shared between the European Union 
and member states. On the Commission’s estimates 62 per cent of the revenue from the tax were to come 
from financial transactions in Britain (Seely, 2014, p. 13). In a House of Lords debate on the issue, the 
Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, Lord Sassoon, proclaimed that since the directive required 
unanimity in the Council of Ministers Britain would have a veto (Seely, 2014, p. 18). However, in October 
2012 11 EU states, led by France and Germany, agreed in principle to move ahead with the tax under the 
procedure of ‘enhanced co-operation’, a process rarely used before and in recent years only in relation to 
divorce and patent law (PWC, 2012).  
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The consequences of these hostile developments were accentuated by the opportunities the euro 
zone crisis gave the large euro zone states to build winning coalitions within the wider European Union. 
For example, there was no initial majority within the EU for the financial transactions’ tax. Indeed, in June 
2012, the EU finance ministers agreed to put all discussion of the matter on hold (Seely, 2014, p. 20). Yet, 
in September 2012, the German and French government reopened the issue. Initially they had the support 
of only six other states to act under ‘enhanced co-operation procedure when the rules required a total of 
nine participating states, with both Italy and Spain, as the two largest members of the euro zone 
periphery, wanting concessions on euro zone matters to join (Spiegel, 2012). But by the end of the 
session 11 states had agreed in principle to the tax (EUrActiv, 2012). Then in January 2013 the EU 
Finance Ministers under QMV rules formally supported the use of the enhanced co-operation to advance 
the tax, leaving Britain and other opponents with no vote on the future shape of the tax even though 
transactions executed by a British bank in London on behalf of a company of a participating member 
would be liable (Barker, 2013). 
By contrast, the British government’s efforts to try to use the euro zone crisis as a political 
bargaining tool to achieve its own objectives came to naught.  After the Commission’s first proposal in 
September 2011 for a Financial Transactions’ Tax applying to all member states, the British Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, sought to tie Britain’s agreement to treaty reform to produce new fiscal rules for 
the euro zone states to a protocol with safeguards to protect the City from new regulation for which Britain 
had not voted. Yet the threat of a British veto at the Brussels summit in December 2011 did not yield the 
effective opt-out for Britain on financial services Cameron sought.  For the German government 
Cameron’s concerns were simply secondary to what it saw as the absolute need for new fiscal rules to 
sustain German domestic support for financial support for the periphery and they it resented what it saw 
as Cameron’s opportunism in using the euro zone crisis to try to achieve singular British ends (Beach, 
2013, p .118). Moreover, Cameron in practice had no leverage. He could not in fact veto a new fiscal 
agreement since the other member-states were willing to sign an inter-governmental pact outside the 
formal EU treaties, even as they included the EU’s institutions in the political mechanisms created in the 
agreement. Indeed, since the German government, which was the keenest among the member states for 
a new treaty in principle, could not in practice risk Britain agreeing to one since British ratification would 
have been dependent on a referendum that would almost certainly have been lost, it is not clear what 
Cameron could ever have achieved from the negotiating strategy he adopted beyond bolstering his Euro-
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sceptic credentials at home. Just as importantly, the other non-euro states, with the temporary exception 
of the Czech Republic, did not take Britain’s side. Again, since Cameron made his stand in terms of the 
singular threat to the City from euro-zone driven regulation, there were no states with which Britain could 
ally. In this sense, the 2011 Brussels summit demonstrated that British preferences had become largely 
irrelevant to euro zone members when the euro zone’s entire existence was in jeopardy and were, as a 
consequence of the City’s position, unaligned with those of other non-euro states. In this political context, 
it is probably not surprising that the Coalition government subsequently made no effort, as Waultraud 
Schelkle (2016, pp. 159-60) has noted, to oppose the banking union agreed by the European Council in 
June 2012, even as it implied the creation of two tiers of financial services within the SEM.  
Having failed to make the old ‘opt-out’ strategy of European Union membership work under the new 
conditions of the euro zone crisis, the British government was left to mount a series of legal challenges in 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to try to protect the City’s position. In September 2013, the British 
government filed a case at the ECJ on the EU’s cap on bankers’ bonuses, which had been agreed in early 
2013 and which the British government argued was agreed without legal authority. In January 2014, the 
ECJ threw out Britain’s challenge to the legal basis of the discretionary power given to the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (Barker, 2014a).  In April 2014, the Court also rejected Britain’s 
challenge to the use of the enhanced co-operation procedure to establish the financial transactions tax for 
the eleven participating members (Barker, 2014b).  Only on the ECB’s locational policy did the British 
government enjoy any legal success when in March 2015 the ECJ ruled that the ECB did not have the 
authority to regulate clearing house activities. Yet even in this case, the Court refused to rule on the 
overriding claim of EU principle on which the British government had made its challenge, namely that the 
ECB had violated the freedoms enshrined in the SEM (Barker and Stafford, 2015).  
The implications of these problems were certainly not lost on the City. In March 2014, the main 
financial services sector lobby group, TheCityUK, published a report calling for the government to be more 
‘muscular’ in its defence of the City’s interests and warned that there was a ‘credible threat’ that the new 
euro zone banking authorities would damage London’s ability to serve its non-domestic client base 
(Jenkins and Jones, 2014). Nonetheless, there was no clear articulation from interests within the City as to 
what they thought a more ‘muscular’ political strategy could be or should have involved. Whilst some 
within the City argued that the SEM should be privileged over sovereignty in financial services regulations, 
others disagreed and were not prepared to accept defeat on the regulatory issues because of the 
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consequences for the non-euro aspects of London’s international business (Levitt, 2012).  Strikingly, 
despite the obvious problems exit from the European Union would cause for the City, there was no 
serious argument made from within the City that Britain should join the euro even though such arguments 
were made in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the issue of the compatibility of benefiting from the 
SEM and staying out of the euro first arose. 
 
The referendum promise and the renegotiations 
 
Under the conditions of the euro zone crisis, the statecraft by which British governments had dealt with the 
problem of Britain’s relative political weakness within the European Union through procuring opt-outs on 
any issue that posed particular difficulties of internal penetration was becoming bankrupt. In the wake of 
this failing external statecraft, the Cameron government’s problems with internal Conservative party 
management over the EU intensified at the same as concerns about rising immigration from within the 
European Union – itself in significant part a result of the euro zone crisis – was increasing the popularity of 
UKIP.  
Seen in statecraft terms, Cameron’s 2013 promise to renegotiate Britain’s membership of the 
European Union and then hold a referendum represented an attempt to reconstruct British influence within 
the union whilst simultaneously re-securing domestic political support for the fundamental principle of 
membership as the details of it jeopardized support for it within the Conservative party and sections of the 
electorate.  Cameron appeared to hope that an opportunity would arise to pursue this re-negotiated 
settlement in the context of treaty reform, whereby he could, among other things, construct an effective de 
facto opt out for the City from new EU rules in exchange for supporting a new EU treaty (Shipman 2016, 
loc 2324).  In practice, this opportunity was not forthcoming. Without new treaty negotiations the strategy 
had to rest on making a credible threat to other EU states to leave the EU. This approach, however, was 
always fraught with danger even if treaty reform had materialized. First, the incentives for others to make 
concessions to keep Britain inside the EU were not overwhelming. Second, any British government would 
struggle to use successfully arguments about the City to re-legitimate democratic consent to membership 
of the European Union Third, Britain’s membership of the European Union was still an important 
component of the Atlantic relationship.  Immediately after his Bloomberg speech in January 2013 when 
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Cameron vowed that a Conservative government would renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership 
and then hold an in-out referendum no later than the end of 2017, the Obama administration warned the 
Prime Minister that it would take a dim view of Britain becoming politically bogged down in negotiations 
and a possible exit (Borger, Traynor & Watt, 2013). In this sense Cameron’s referendum tactic risked not 
only membership of the European Union itself, which the Prime Minister wished to preserve, but a 
potentially much larger crisis of the security components of external support structure premised before 
anything else on the Atlantic relationship.  
For the City the referendum promise exposed its interests directly to national democratic politics 
even though in terms of the concessions he sought Cameron demanded in 2014 what he called ‘cast-iron’ 
legal protections for the City against the euro zone members acting as a caucus to impose financial 
services legislation on Britain (Watt, 2014).  Whatever Cameron initially decided to prioritise for his 
confrontation with the European Union, and he initially did choose the City, the pressure from voters for 
change lay elsewhere.  Soon UKIP’s success in the elections to the European Parliament in June 2014 
and two by-elections to the House of Commons in the autumn of the same year pushed the centre of 
euro-sceptic gravity in the parliamentary Conservative party further towards the issue of immigration and 
away from the City Indeed, by the end of 2014, Cameron’s own rhetoric on changing the terms of Britain’s 
membership had become primarily focused on the free movement of labour within the European Union at 
the expense of the City (Shipman 2016, loc 556-631).  Whether this language reflected anything more 
than an effort to prop up the Conservatives’ vote against UKIP in the 2015 general election is not easy to 
tell. Yet Cameron’s effective embrace of the freedom of movement issue in the run up to the general 
election undoubtedly had consequences when the Conservatives’ victory in June 2015 meant that the 
Prime Minister had to redeem his promise of a referendum.  Whilst freedom of movement had not featured 
in Cameron’s 2013 Bloomberg speech, Cameron was left after the general election committed to 
renegotiating the terms of Britain’s membership of the European Union under domestic political conditions 
where the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement provisions of the EU treaties were highly 
politicised.  In this political context the City’s offshore interests and their relationship to the SEM became 
at best a secondary consideration for the British government. Indeed, when in November 2015 Cameron 
announced the government’s priorities for the renegotiation protecting the City from a voting-bloc of euro 
zone states was only one of four aims and his letter to European Council President, Donald Tusk, 
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explicitly ruled out seeking any new opt out covering financial services, which had been the Prime 
Minister’s earlier aim (Parker, Pickard, Noble & Barker, 2015).  
Even within these limited objectives, the British government’s negotiating capacity was always 
weak. Cameron’s aim was, as set out in his letter to Tusk to achieve ‘legally binding principles’ on a 
number of issues that included the ‘integrity of the SEM’ such that ‘there should be no discrimination and 
no disadvantage for any business on the basis of the currency of their country’ and that ‘any issues that 
affect all Member States must be discussed and decided by all Member States’ (Cameron, 2015). His 
strategy to realise these ends had to rest on making an explicit argument that the European Union was 
now clearly divided into those states inside the euro zone and those outside it even as denial of that reality 
remained important to the Union’s self-presentation and other non-euro members had joined at least one 
of the Fiscal Compact or the Banking Union since the euro zone crisis began (Schelke, 2016, pp. 158-
160). Consequently, in trying to align Britain’s interests with those of the other eight non-euro states, this 
strategy had to dodge the singularity of Britain’s position. Unlike other non-euro members, Britain 
possessed a Tier-1 financial centre, which served as the offshore centre of the euro zone. Meanwhile the 
other EU states had clear incentives to insist, against British preferences, on locating the system risks 
from euro clearing houses within the euro zone itself where they could be managed by euro zone 
authorities.  
Unsurprisingly in this political context the final agreement in February 2016 on new terms for 
Britain’s membership would have provided in the event of a Remain vote little protection for the City from 
future euro-zone generated regulation if and when a clear political will emerged within the euro zone to 
confront the City’s position. The agreement stated that ‘legal acts … directly linked to the functioning of 
the euro area shall respect the internal market … and shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in 
trade between Member states’ (European Union, 2016). But no robust political mechanism for 
guaranteeing how that principle would be upheld was identified since the agreement only allowed Britain 
unilaterally to escalate any issue pertaining to the principle to the European Council for discussion. 
Without granting Britain a veto, the agreement offered no effective safeguard for its minority position. 
More generally, the Cameron government’s negotiations with the other EU states acutely exposed 
the City’s political vulnerability in the post-2008 financial and political world.  On the one hand inside or 
outside the European Union there was a significant risk that London could be increasingly closed out of its 
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euro business. On the other, Cameron’s failure in the renegotiations to secure meaningful concessions on 
what had become the crucial political issue of freedom of movement increased the likelihood that voters 
would choose Brexit over ongoing membership, risking leaving the City outside the SEM.  Quite simply, in 
a referendum campaign where immigration would become a central issue the City lacked political 
influence. Within the City the loudest Remain voices were the CEOs of international banks, like JP 
Morgan, who were left to make arguments that Brexit would cost banking jobs in London in an 
atmosphere in which the distributional costs and benefits of a highly internationalised economy were being 
contested in democratic politics for the first time in three or four decades. In this sense Cameron was 
unable to protect the City from his own government’s political inability within the EU to separate the 
freedom of movement issue from other parts of the SEM when freedom of movement started to threaten 
Britain’s ongoing membership of the European Union. Circumstances before 2008, which if they had still 
prevailed might have required concessions from other member-states on this issue, had been replaced by 




Although it can seem that the City of London has long enjoyed effective political protection from British 
governments, the history of the relationship between the City’s offshore interests and the external 
strategies deployed by British governments in their statecraft is complex. Whilst at times the City’s 
interests and those of British governments have been aligned at other times the City’s offshore business 
has proved a significant statecraft predicament. For a long time, the City was fortunate that its offshore 
currency interests were not significantly contested abroad and the strength of the statecraft commitment 
was not put to a decisive test.  In particular, successive US administrations accepted the Eurodollar 
market and the importance of London to US banks. Meanwhile London’s emergence as the offshore 
financial centre of the euro was not predicted by the euro zone states when the British government 
secured an opt-out of monetary union in the 1990s.  
By contrast, the City’s offshore position was almost threatened immediately by the 2008 financial 
crash and in particular the euro zone crisis.  The euro zone crisis also created a set of profound problems 
for the statecraft of British governments around the EU that has now deepened the threat to the City’s 
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offshore euro business and put at risk the City’s participation in the SEM. Most significantly, the euro zone 
crisis rendered it impossible for British governments to secure more opt-outs to prevent significant 
penetration of the European Union into domestic issues deemed of fundamental importance either to 
British economic interests, or national democratic politics.  Under the imperative to move towards further 
fiscal and banking integration, the most powerful EU states, in particularly Germany, lost the incentive to 
accommodate British preferences on opt-outs.  Meanwhile the Cameron governments’ determination to 
defend the City from new regulation, not least that directed specifically against London’s offshore currency 
interests, made constructing a non-euro bloc to oppose new financial policies extremely difficult. Whilst 
the Cameron governments endeavoured to preserve the singular integrity of the SEM in regard to financial 
services, they lacked the bargaining power to separate out the issue of the freedom of movement from the 
other components of the SEM once freedom of movement became acutely politicized in British domestic 
politics.  
In pursuing the referendum strategy when, as George Osborne reportedly said to his Treasury team 
‘Britain h[eld very few of the cards’ (Shipman, 2016  loc 2994), the post-2015 Cameron government could 
only through attempting to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s EU membership demonstrate in practice the 
acute limits of  Britain’s political influence inside the union. When in 2016 Cameron put Britain’s 
membership of the European Union on the line, there nothing was offer to save it. If, as Bulpitt (2008, p. 
143) argued, the effect of the long-standing statecraft of British government has been ‘to avoid problems, 
not solve them’ then Cameron’s referendum gambit did what previous government had sought to avoid on 
the European Union, letting loose ‘a Pandora’s box of trouble’ that had been ‘waiting to get out’. The 
consequences of this fundamental disruption to the statecraft of British governments have pushed the City 
into a very difficult position not only in relation to protecting its offshore euro position, but its whole 
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